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FINANCING INNOVATION: LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS SECURITY IN FINANCING,

1845-2014

XUAN-THAO NGUYEN*

INTRODUCTION

Commentators have repeatedly raised questions about the United States'
ability to continue to be an innovative nation.' Some complained that compared
to other countries with higher rates on innovation, the United States has fallen
behind due to lack of funding for research.2 Small businesses, known for being
incubators of new ideas and job creation, continue to face major obstacles in
obtaining government funding and financing from lenders.' While lenders are
willing to extend credit to large businesses, they often ignore small businesses. 4

* Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen is the Gerald L. Bepko Chair in Law and Director ofCenter
for Intellectual Property & Innovation, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
Special thanks to all the participants at the Vietnam Ministry of Science and Technology and
Vietnam Institute of Intellectual Property Research at the workshop on financing innovation. Many
thanks to Reid E. Dodge, Editor in Chief of the IndianaLaw Review, for inviting me to contribute
this article. I dedicate this article to Erik Darwin Hille and Khai-Leif Nguyen-Hille; their
unconditional love and support allowed my smooth transition to Indiana University.
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY OF

THE UNITED STATES (2012), availableat http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
2012/january/competes_01051 1_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7QP-NV5W [hereinafter
COMMERCE REPORT] ("[A] larms began to sound about the U.S. economy's ability to remain [in its
past position].... Observers have expressed concern that the scientific and technological building
blocks critical to our economic leadership have been eroding .... "); see generallyNAT'L ECON.
COUNCIL, THE WHITE HOUSE'S STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nec/StrategyforAmericanlnnovation, archivedat
http://perma.cc/G26Q-E7J9 (attempting to address the innovation issue with a grand plan to set the
country on a multi-approach path); Harold L. Sirkin, Has the U.S. Lost Its Innovation Edge,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-0121/has-america-lost-is-innovation-edge, archived at http://perma.cc/MN7V-LY9Y (noting that
"only one in five of the 1,500 executives who participated in the fall 2013 survey rated their
company's innovation performance as strong .... ").
2. See generally Eamonn Fingleton, America the Innovative?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/3 1/sunday-review/america-the-innovativehtmi?pagewanted=all
archived at http://perma.cc/X8Q4-7QVM (stating that funding for research was the reason for
American's mid-twentieth Century rise in innovation and lacking funding today will negatively
impact American's innovation pace).
3. See, e.g., COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 1.
4. Karen Gordon Mills& Brayden McCarthy, The State ofSmall Business Lending: Credit
Access Duringthe Recovery and How Technology May Change the Game 4-6 (Harvard Business
School, Working Paper No. 15-004), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%
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The dire financing situation faced by small businesses today is similar to the
credit squeeze during and after the epic financial crisis in 2009.'
Without funding from both public and private sectors, small businesses
cannot operate their companies, innovate for new ideas, and foster employment
growth.6 The United States may soon lose its edge in innovation. How can
financing be made available for small businesses that most often own neither real
property nor tangible assets?
Small businesses have ideas, trademarks, content, know-hows, and other
intangible assets.7 These intangible properties can be used as collateral to obtain
financing from the private sector.8 Lenders must be willing to accept this type of
property as collateral in order for credits to be extended to small businesses.
Creditors must overcome their reluctance in these commercial transactions. This
Article argues that lenders should take great comfort in making loans to small
businesses with intellectual property assets serving as collateral. The United
States has a long legal history of paving the path for financing innovation, as seen
through the development of decisional law spanning from 1845 to the present. 9
The established history of lending with intellectual property collateral is uniquely
American.'° Recourses and remedies under strong rules of law system are readily
available for secured lenders and creditors who are willing to finance
innovation."
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of embracing
patents, copyrights and trademarks in chattel mortgages. This part analyzes early
cases, including the seminal case, Waterman v. Mackenzie, 2 in patent mortgages,
and their significance in recognizing the incorporeal property and the right of the
mortgagee. Additionally, Part I focuses on the development in copyright statutes
in relation to the use of copyrights in mortgages. Most importantly, the arrival
of new technologies necessitated the increase of financing for the creation and
distribution of copyrighted content and legal developments in the area of
foreclosure of copyright mortgages. 3 Part I also examines whether trademarks
were used in chattel mortgages during the similar period of patent and copyright

20Files/15-004_09b 1bf8b-eb2a-4e63-9c4e-0374f770856f.pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/8PUSSZ97.
5. See id. at 8-10 (studying the lending patterns to small businesses before and after the 2008
economic recession).
6. See, e.g., COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-6.
7. See, e.g., id.
8. See, e.g., id.
9. See Wilson v. Rousseau, 30 F. Cas. 162, 182 (Cir. Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1845).
10. See JayM. Mattappally, GoliathBeatsDavid: Undoing theLeahy-SmithAmericalnvents
Act's Harmful Effects on Small Businesses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 981,987-91 (2012).
11. See Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224 (E.D.
Wash. 2005).
12. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
13. See Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank of L.A., 197 F.2d 767, 770 (9th
Cir. 1952).
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mortgages. Due to the nature of trademarks, the stricter view of trademarks and14
their attached goodwill, trademark mortgages faced certain limitations.
Recognizing the limitations of trademark mortgages, this section compares how
patent, copyright and trademark provisions differ statutorily in their recording
requirements for mortgages.
Part II moves to the post-war period of robust economic growth and
commercial law reform nationwide. The adoption of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code marks a new era of creating uniform law for states to
encourage financing based on personal property as the backbone of economic
growth. 5 Paralleling the development in uniform commercial law, historic
milestones in intellectual property law are seen through the overhauls in
trademark law, patent law, and copyright law that modernized intellectual
property law. 6 Part II traces the intersection of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and intellectual property law. This intersection led to new
approaches to patent collateral, copyright collateral, and trademark collateral.'"
Particularly, the old mortgages were replaced with a new understanding and
In addition,
practice of security interest in modern secured transactions."
challenging issues relating to whether federal or state law will govern perfection
of intellectual property must be resolved in order for financing based on
intellectual property to flourish. 9
Part III looks beyond financing based on intellectual property in the private
sector. This part will examine the United States' government's role in financing
small businesses with intellectual property assets. The United States Small
Business Administration has a history of extending loans to small businesses and
accepting intellectual property as security for the repayment of loans. 20 This
section will analyze decisional law for a comprehensive understanding of both the
practice and legal development of the government's financing for small business
innovation.
Part IV shifts to contemporary issues arising in financing innovation.
Specifically, this part dissects the recourse and remedies available to secured
creditors in financing innovation when the borrower could not fulfill payment
obligations. This part analyzes recent Federal Circuit decisions determining
whether a secured party of intellectual property collateral becomes the owner of
the intellectual property by operation of law in post default. Predictability as to
ownership of intellectual property collateral in post default will enhance financing

14. See In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 886, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1921).
15. See Adam J. Levitin, The PaperChase: Securitization,Foreclosure,andthe Uncertainty
of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637, 697 (2013).
16. See Harold R. Weinberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Easing Transfer and Security
Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform, 79 KY. L.J. 61, 62-65

(1990).
17. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, CollateralizingIntellectualProperty,42 GA. L. REv. 1,5 (2007).

18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 25.
20. Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119, 121 (D.D.C. 1966).
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of innovation.21

There are some risks associated with financing innovation.2 Part V identifies
and assesses the risks. Notably, the risks include whether a grant of security
interest in some circumstances is deemed a fraudulent transfer and whether the
23 However, these risks are rare in
secured creditor is liable for infringement.
24
sector.
private
the
by
innovation
financing
Learning from the development of financing innovation from 1845 to the
present, Part VI offers observations and discusses implications for future
financing of innovation. There is a need for both traditional and online lenders
to appreciate the intellectual property assets held by small businesses. 25 The
intellectual property assets should be included in the analytics in assessing the
overall health of a business seeking a loan or a line of credit for its new
innovative product, idea, or vision.26 The Article ends with a brief conclusion
that in order to maintain the United States' innovative edge, attention to the
access to financing by small businesses must be at the center of the discussion,
and intellectual property must be recognized as part of that center.
I. EMBRACING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MORTGAGES

In 1790, Congress passed the first patent and copyright statutes during its
very first year of governing the new country.27 Appreciating the importance of
intellectual property in the development of the new nation, the new statutes and
subsequent amendments provided a uniform system relating to the eligibility for
receiving legal protection, duration of protection, infringement, remedies and
transfers of ownership. 28 The idea of using patents, copyrights and trademarks

21.
2005).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 148 F. App'x 924, 928-30 (Fed. Cir.

Id.
Id.
See Nguyen, supra note 17, at 36.
Mills & McCarthy, supra note 4, at 4.
Id. at 42-44.
See generally Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45 (2013) (stating that Congress passed the first federal Patent Act of 1790
providing inventors with a term of protection for fourteen years); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the
Intellectual PropertyClause: Promotion ofProgress as a Limitation on Congress'sIntellectual

PropertyPower, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006) (tracing the development of the patent and copyright
clause in the Constitution and congressional power in enacting federal laws on patents and
copyrights); Edward C. Walterscheid, Understandingthe Copyright Act of 1790: The Issue of
Common Law Copyright in America and the Modern Interpretationof the CopyrightPower, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 313 (2006) (analyzing the early debate of whether the rights associated
with the patent and copyright clause were inherent or created rights).
28. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790), available at http://ipmall.info/
hostedresources/lipa/patents/Patent Act of 1790.pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/M5VU-C9B7

(current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1to -2071 (2014), availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
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as security for payment obligations did not exist during the late eighteenth
century, but the use of chattel or personal property2 9 as security for debt or chattel
mortgage was common practice."
Chattel mortgage transactions and law developed during the Colonial
America period.3 In a chattel mortgage, the mortgagor conveyed to the
mortgagee the right, title and interest in the chattels to secure the payment of a
debt, upon condition that the transfer would be voided by the mortgagor's
subsequent timely payment of the debt.3 2 The chattel mortgage financing allowed

pac/mpep/consolidatedlaws.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YF75-3F9V). Some critics have
argued that the United States government has recognized the importance of intellectual property
and purposefully created patent law and amendments to protect the interests of domestic businesses
and inventors. See William Hubbard, CompetitivePatentLaw, 65 FLA. L. REv. 341, 356-58 (2013)
(observing specific patent statutory provisions that protect domestic interests in patents against
foreign businesses and inventors).
29. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured TransactionsHistory: The FraudulentMyth, 29
N.M. L. REv. 363, 398 (1999) (tracing the history of chattel mortgage as far back as in "1682 the
Connecticut General Court upheld a chattel mortgage, a nonpossessory secured transaction but with
possession in a third party, the debtor's agent, on a tannery's inventory and equipment against a
levying judgment lien."); George Lee Flint, Jr. & Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured Transactions
History: The Impact of Southern Stable Agriculture on the First Chattel Mortgage Acts in the
Anglo-American World, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (2004) (asserting that early Colonial
America adopted various chattel mortgage statutes for nonpossessory secured transactions with
filing requirements); see also Conard v. Ins. Co., 26 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1828) (discussing the
existence of mortgage practices in which property served as security that was not real estate).
30. Andrew R. Berman, "Once a Mortgage,Always a Mortgage "-The Use (andMisuse o)
Mezzanine Loans and PreferredEquity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 76, 89 (2005)
(stating that "all of the British North American colonies that later became states adopted the
wholesale use of mortgages and based their mortgage law on the common law of England.").
31. See George Lee Flint, Jr. & Marie Juliet Alfaro, SecuredTransactionsHistory: The First
Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Anglo-American World, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1403, 1406-07
(2004) (providing a historical account of chattel mortgage statutes adopted by states in early
Colonial American period and noting that a striking feature of these chattel mortgage acts adopted
by various states was the filing requirement); see also Mortgage, Chattel-Title to Increase, 1
HARv.L. REv. 306,306 (1888) (noting that under the then Maryland Code a chattel mortgage is
good without possession if it is recorded).
32. Farnum v. Metcalf, 62 Mass. 46,46 (1851) ("A mortgage, made byA. to B., was assigned
by B. to C., to secure a debt, upon condition that if B. should pay the debt, the assignment should
determine and become void, and the assigned premises should revest in B., his heirs and assigns.");
Carter v. Rewey, 22 N.W. 129, 129 (Wis. 1885) (recognizing a chattel mortgage in the following
transaction: "It is in the usual form of a chattel mortgage. For the purpose of securing the payment
of $1,000, Charles H. McLean bargained, sold, and transferred to the plaintiffs all of his stock in
trade-consisting ofa quantity ofj ewelry-and other personal property named, upon the condition
that if McLean should forthwith pay the three debts specified, amounting to the sum of $385, also
to secure such other claims against him as might come into the hands of the plaintiffs for collection,
and a claim of Aiken, Lambert & Co. of $127, then the sale to be void."); see also Erskine v.
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individuals and businesses to gain access to financing and reduced the lender's
risks.33
After the American Revolution, intellectual property assets slowly became
important and valuable, and lenders began to accept them in chattel mortgages.34
Questions regarding the scope of a mortgagee's right in the mortgaged intellectual
property arose in due course.35 The mortgagee wanted to know whether they
could bring an infringement suit against others during the time period when the
mortgagor had not fulfilled the payment obligations36 and whether recording a
patent mortgage would vest the mortgagee with the entire title in the patent. 7
Another unanswered question was, under federalism separating the jurisdictions
of federal and state courts, which law would govern the foreclosure of mortgaged
patents and copyrights.3" In addition, there was not a settled opinion as to
whether trademarks should be mortgaged like patents and copyrights.39 Early
cases addressed these questions, thereby widening the path for financing with the
use of intellectual property in mortgages.4"
A. Patent Mortgages
The United States Supreme Court widely opened the door for financing with
the use of patent assets as security in the famous Waterman v. Mackenzie decision
in 1891.41 In that case, Mrs. Waterman borrowed $6500 from Asa L. Shipman

Townsend, 2 Mass. 493, 494 (Mass. 1807) (recognizing a land mortgage wherein the defendant
"pleads a bond dated the same day, in the penal sum of 500 dollars, with a condition-after reciting
that the defendant, owing the plaintiff 241 dollars 30 cents, and for the better securing the payment
of the same, had conveyed to the plaintiff fifty acres of land-that, if the defendant should pay the
plaintiff that sum in six months, and the plaintiff shall then reconvey the land to the defendant, the
bond was to be void.").
33. Flint & Alfaro, supra note 31, at 562, 570 (demonstrating how oversea merchants from
England and the Netherlands were eager to lend to planters in Virginia and took security in
personalty, including "indentured servants, goods and bills of exchange" and that the booming
plantation economy paved the way for small planters to seek "greater wealth through expansion
based on secured loans").
34. See infra Part L.A-C.
35. See generally Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank of L.A., 197 F.2d 767
(9th Cir. 1952).
39. See generally Morgan v. Rogers, 19 F. 596 (Cir. Ct. D.R.I. 1884).
40. Id.
41. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 258. Patents as security for loans occurred for quite some time
before the United States Supreme Court decided its Waterman decision. See Wilson v. Rousseau,
30 F. Cas. 162, 182 (Cir. Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1845) (observing that "[a] patentee having mortgaged the
patent-right, continued in the notorious use of it, until he became bankrupt"); Hollins & Napier v.
Mallard, 10 How. Pr. 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854) (holding that the mortgagee has a lien on the patents
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& Son on November 25, 1884.42 To secure the payment on the promissory note,
Mrs. Waterman mortgaged the patent relating to inventions of fountain pens
obtained by her inventor-husband by executing a conditional assignment, which
contained an express provision that the assignment should be null and void if the
payment obligation was paid on the due date. 43 As mortgagee, Asa L. Shipman
& Sons and its subsequent assignee, Asa L. Shipman, timely recorded the patent
mortgage with the Patent Office."n Mr. Waterman transferred the ownership in
the patents to his wife on February 13, 1884, received a license to manufacture
under the patents from his wife on November 20, 1884, and brought a patent
infringement action against an alleged infringer. 45 The alleged infringer in turn
challenged the plaintiff for lack of standing to maintain the suit, as the patents had
already been mortgaged.4 6 At the time of the infringement suit, Mrs. Waterman
had not fulfilled the payment obligation to Asa L. Shipman.47
By recording the patent mortgage with the Patent Office, the Court ruled that
the entire title in the patent, both in law and equity, was acquired by the
mortgagee, Asa L. Shipman.48 Therefore, the mortgagee enjoyed all rights in the
49
mortgaged patents, including the right to maintain a patent infringement action.
The Court began its analysis by first recognizing that the executed "assignment"
between Mrs. Waterman and Asa L. Shipman was an "instrument, being a
conveyance made to secure the payment of a debt, upon condition that it should
be avoided by the subsequent payment of that debt at a time fixed, was a
mortgage, in apt terms, and in legal effect."5
The Court then distinguished mortgages in personal property, like patents,
from those of real estate. 5 The Court observed that in real estate financing, the
mortgagor has possession of the land and is the equitable owner of the property
and the mortgagee has either bare legal title or merely a lien on the property,
depending on state laws.52

for a regulator and an improvement in gas burners); Moran v. Strauss, 6 Ben. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1872)
(mentioning that the patents were assigned to the defendants as security for the loan).
42. Watennan, 138 U.S. at 257.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 252.
47. Id. at 257-58.
48. Id. at 260.
49. Id. at 261.
50. Id. at 258.
51. Id. at 258-60.
52. Id. at 258-59 ("A mortgage of real estate has gradually, partly by the adoption of rules
of equity in courts of common law, and partly by express provisions of statute, come to be more
and more considered as a mere security for the debt, creating a lien or encumbrance only, and
leaving the title in the mortgagor, subject to alienation, levy on execution, dower, and other
incidents of a legal estate; but the rules upon the subject vary in different states, and a mortgage is
everywhere considered as passing the title in the land, so far as may be necessary for the protection
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In personalty mortgages, however, the Court noted that "it is not merely the
possession or a special property that passes; but, both at law and in equity, the
whole title is transferred to the mortgagee, as security for the debt. '5 3 That meant
the personalty mortgagee enjoyed both the equitable title and the legal title to the
personal property. 54 The whole title is subject "only to be defeated by
performance of the condition" described in the mortgage instrument. 55 In other
words, the law for personalty mortgage is clearly different from the law for
pledges and realty mortgage. 6 Although the personalty mortgagee does not have
possession of the property like in pledges, the entire title to the property has
already passed to the
57 mortgagee to secure the loan provided to the mortgagor
from the mortgagee.
Moreover, the Court stated, "a recording of the mortgage is a substitute for,
and (unless in case of actual fraud) equivalent to, a delivery of possession, and
makes the title and the possession of the mortgagee good against all the world."58
That meant if the mortgagee adheres to the recording statute for personalty
mortgage, the mortgagee will be accorded with possessory rights and the
recording serves as notice to all for priority purposes.59
Applying to the case at hand, noting that a patent right is "incorporeal
property," the Court commented that neither actual delivery nor possession could
occur.6" Therefore, the recording of the patent mortgage with the United States
Patent Office in accordance with patent law "is equivalent to a delivery of
possession, and makes the title of the mortgagee
complete towards all other
61
persons, as well as against the mortgagor.
In deciding the scope of the patent mortgagee's rights, the Court analogized

of the mortgagee, and to give him the full benefit of his security.").
53. Id. at 258.
54. Id. at 260-61.
55. Id.(observing the right of the mortgagee in the patented mortgage is "only to be defeated
by performance of the condition, or by redemption on bill in equity within a reasonable time, and
the right of possession, when there is no express stipulation to the contrary, goes with the right of
property.").
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Story, Bailm § 287; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1030, 1031; Caseyv. Cavaroc, 96 U.S.
467,477 (1877); Conard v. AtI. Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 26 U.S. 386 (1828); Brackett v. Bullard, 53 Mass.
308 (1847); Boise v. Knox, 51 Mass. 40 (1845)).
58. Id. at 260; see also Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870), availableat
http://ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/patents/Patent Act of_ 1870.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/8B2Z-LEJR (prescribing that the recording requirement for "assignment, grant, or
conveyance" and these transactions "shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the patent office
within three months from the date thereof').
59. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 260.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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and distinguished patent mortgages from land mortgages.62 The Court observed
that, in a land mortgage transaction, even without possession of the land, the
mortgagee may obtain an "action for an injury to his interest," an injunction or
damages for activities as "tends to impair the value of the mortgage security, or
as is not allowed by good husbandry or by express or implied license from the
mortgagee."63 Most importantly, only the mortgagee had standing to maintain
suit, "and not by the mortgagor or any one claiming under a subsequent
conveyance from him." 64 In a patent mortgage, however, the Court is concerned
about patent rights.65 Unlike land rights, the right conferred by a patent is limited
in years, and the patent's value is primarily "in the profits derived from royalties
and license fees."66 The Court therefore declared:
In analogy to the rules governing mortgages of lands and of chattels, and
with even stronger reason, the assignee of a patent by a mortgage duly
recorded, whose security is constantly wasting by the lapse of time, must
be held (unless otherwise provided in the mortgage) entitled to grant
licenses, to receive license fees and royalties, and to have an account of
profits or an award of damages against infringers.67
Accordingly, the Court held that the patent mortgagee is accorded the status of
"the party interested, either as patentee, assignee, or grantee," and has the right
to bring suit against others at law and suit in equity "to recover damages for an
infringement. 6 1 Consequently, in the present case, the patent mortgagee, Asa L.
Shipman, was entitled to maintain an infringement action against others.69 Mrs.
Waterman therefore had no standing because she had already mortgaged the
patents to Asa L. Shipman.7" In reaching a conclusion, the Court explicitly
rejected the law propounded under the English Judicature Act of 1873 and the
Patent Act of 1883 wherein only the mortgagor of a patent was allowed to
maintain a suit for infringement.71

62. Id. at 258-59.
63. Id. at 259.
64. Id. at 259 (citing Wood v. Weimar, 104 U. S. 786 (1881); Conard v. Atl. Ins. Co. ofN.Y.,
26 U.S. 386 (1828); Clapp v. Campbell, 124 Mass. 50 (Mass. 1877)).

65. Id.
66. Id.at 260.
67. Id. at 261.
at 260 (ruling that the patent mortgagee is the person of interest and further asserting
68. Id.
that "it cannot have been the intention of congress that a suit in equity against an infringer to obtain
an injunction and an account of profits, in which the court is authorized to award damages, when
necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff, and has the same power to treble the damages as in an
action at law, should not be brought by the same person").
69. Id. at 260-61.
70. Id. at 261.
71. Id. ("In the light of our legislation and decisions, no weight can be given to the case of
Van Gelder v. Society, 44 Ch. Div. 374, in which, upon pleadings and facts similar to those now
before us, the mortgagor of a patent was treated as a mortgagor in possession, and was allowed to
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Waterman v. Mackenzie is significant for several reasons. First, land and real
estate are no longer the only security property for secured financing." Second,
creditors are willing to extend loans to debtors with patents. and other personal
property served as security.73 Third, the mortgagee can enjoy all of the debtor's
rights, title, and interest in the patent if the mortgagee properly recorded the
patent mortgage.74 The rights in the patents cover the right to grant licenses, to
collect fees and royalties, and to receive damages and accounting of profits
against infringers. 7' Fourth, the patent mortgagee has standing to maintain suit
against others for infringement of the mortgaged patent.76 Consequently, the
mortgagee would be able to reduce its exposure in the event the debtor fails to
make payment.7 7 Also, the mortgagee's rights in the patent mortgage accords it
with the status of "the party interested" similar to patentee, assignee, or grantee
during the entire time while the patent serves as collateral for the mortgage
transaction.78 Overall, Waterman v. Mackenzie encourages the financial industry
to provide financing to individuals and entities with patents that could be used in
chattel mortgage financing.79
B. Copyright Mortgages
Patents were not the only type of intellectual property eligible for mortgages
in the nineteenth century.8" Copyright mortgages were associated with book and
music publishing.8 Moreover, copyright laws during this time mentioned

maintain a suit for infringement, under the provisions of the English Judicature Act of 1873 and
Patent Act of 1883. St. 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 25; 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, §§ 23, 46, 87. Whether, in
a suit brought by the mortgagee, the court, at the suggestion of the mortgagor, or of the mortgagee,
or of the defendants, might, in its discretion, and for the purpose of preventing multiplicity of suits
or miscarriage of justice, permit or order the mortgagor to be joined, either as a plaintiff or as a
defendant, need not be considered, because no such question is presented by this record.").
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Notably, in cases decided post-Waterman, the mortgages increased from large amount
of loans involving intellectual property collateral. See, e.g., United Lines Tel. Co. v. Boston SafeDeposit & Trust Co., 147 U.S. 431, 433-38 (1893).
80. See Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 131 (1889).
81. See id.("[I]f Thompson should go out of business, or cease to prosecute the sale of the
Manning book, then, unless the successor of Thompson would continue the same, Hubbard Bros.
should have the exclusive right to sell said book; and that, on the execution of such contract,
Thompson would assign the copyright to Hubbard Bros., and they would execute a mortgage to him
on such plates, cuts, and stamps, to secure to him the performance of the contract."); Doff v.
Denton, 17 F. Supp. 531, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (discussing infringement action relating to the
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copyright mortgages in the recordation provision. 82 Indeed, in 1834, Congress
included the recordation requirement for assignments of copyright.8 3 If an
assignment was not recorded within 60 days of the execution, it was to be
"judged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for
valuable consideration without notice. '" 4 Also, in 1909, Congress consolidated
and created the comprehensive Copyright Act. 5 Under the 1909 Copyright Act,
section 42 permitted copyrights to be assigned and mortgaged.86 Section 44
required that assignments of copyrights must be recorded within three months of
execution in order for it to be valid against subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees.87

Mortgages on copyrights became more prevalent with the arrival of
technologies for new mediums of expression, copying, and distribution,
especially in the area of motion pictures and television.8 s Republic PicturesCorp.
v. Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles provides a closer look at the
practice of mortgages on copyrights in the motion picture industry. 9
In that case, Pre-Em Pictures owned the story, treatment, script, continuity,

mortgage of copyrights in music compositions); Buss Mach. Works v. Watsontown Door & Sash
Co., 2 F. Supp. 758, 758 (E.D. Penn. 1933) (explaining that typically, in most chattel mortgage
transactions, the mortgage would be broad and cover "all plants, factories and structures now or
hereafter erected upon or attached to any of the lands which, or interest in which, are hereby
conveyed or intended so to be, and all fixtures, equipment, machinery, apparatus, tools, implements
and appliances, materials and supplies at present or in the future belonging thereto, whether or not
the same be affixed to the fireehold or be used in the operation of any of said premises or as a part
of said plants or any of them, and patents, application for patents, trademarks, trade names,
copyrights, formulae and the good will of the business now or hereafter carried on by the
Company").
82. See Copyright Amendment, Act of June 30, 1834, 23d Cong., (1st Sess.), 4 Stat. 728.
Section 205(a) (1834) ("[A]ll deeds or instruments in writing for the transfer or assignment of
copyrights, being proved or acknowledged in such manner as deeds for the conveyance of land are
required by law to be proved or acknowledged in the same state or district, shall and may be
recorded in the office where the original copyright is deposited and recorded; and every such deed
or instrument that shall in any time hereafter be made and executed, and which shall not be proved
or acknowledged and recorded as aforesaid, within sixty days after its execution, shall be judged
fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration
without notice.").
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. Law 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/history/l909act.pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/4TA3-C9D6 (repealed
in 1976).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank of L.A., 197 F.2d 767, 771 (9th Cir.
1952).
89. Id. at 768.
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and manuscript composition of a motion picture photoplay based on a story
entitled, "A Song For Miss Julie." 90 Pre-Em Pictures received certain advances
from the Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles and provided the bank with
the copyright in the motion picture as security for the advances.91 Later, Pre-Em
Pictures defaulted on the loans and the bank sued Pre-Em Pictures in federal court
to foreclose on the mortgaged copyright. 92 The district court ordered the
foreclosure, and the copyright was sold to the bank at public auction by the
United States Marshal.93
Republic Pictures was the distributor of the motion picture under an
agreement with Pre-Em Pictures.94 Republic Pictures refused to recognize the
title in the copyrights purchased by the bank at public auction. 95 The bank then
sued Republic Pictures for declaratory relief to determine the rights in the
copyright acquired by the bank. 96 The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.97
The Ninth Circuit held that. federal courts have no jurisdiction over
foreclosure of copyright mortgages even though they have subject matter
jurisdiction over copyrights.98 Foreclosures on mortgaged copyrights are within
the provenance of state courts and state law. 99 The court indicated that it was
merely following other courts' decisions on foreclosures of mortgaged patents.100
The reasoning in Republic Pictures further aided the development of
intellectual property financing law. It followed federalism principles by
recognizing that certain areas of law, such as copyrights and patents are within
federal subject matter jurisdiction, and other areas of law, such as commercial
law, are within state subject matter jurisdiction.1 'O The court in Republic Pictures
exercised restraint as dictated by the Constitution.10 2 By so doing, it respected the
development of secured transactions law at the state level despite the fact that the
collateral property involved federally granted rights. 103
C. TrademarkMortgages
The development of trademark mortgages began roughly the same time as

90. Id. at 771 n.1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 770.
99. Id.
100. Id.(citing Keiper v. Amico, 20 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (1940) (holding that federal courts
have no jurisdiction over foreclosure of patent mortgages)).
101. Id.
102. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. 1.
103. Republic Pictures, 197 F.2d at 770.
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patent and copyright mortgages." ° Trademark mortgages, however, faced
limitations. °5 The view of courts at that time was that trademarks could not be
transferred without the underlying business; therefore, trademarks could not by
themselves, apart from the business, be used as security in mortgages. 0 6
Consequently, unlike patent mortgages, where a simple recording with the Patent
Office would bestow the mortgagee with rights similar to those of the patentee
or grantee while the patent mortgagor continued to use the mortgaged patents in
the operation of its business,'0 7 mortgages with trademarks were more
cumbersome.'08
For example, in Morgan v. Rogers, J. Miller & Sons ("Miller & Sons")
manufactured and distributed certain medicines under a specific trademark.0 9
The mortgagee, Morgan, made a very large loan in the amount of $48,500 to
Miller & Sons in 1875.0 He executed a chattel mortgage to secure the debt, took
possession of the property under the mortgage through agency, and operated
Miller & Sons' business of the manufacture and sale of medicines."' Two years
later, Miller & Sons granted the defendant, Rogers, the exclusive rights to use the
same trademarks to sell their medicinal compounds."' The mortgagee brought
a suit to enjoin the defendant's use of the trademarks."'
The court addressed whether the mortgagee had amortgage in Miller & Sons'
trademarks. 14 The pertinent provision in the chattel mortgage provided:
The following articles of personal property, now in our possession, and
now in and upon the premises known and designated as numbers (8)
eight and (12) twelve High street, in said city of Providence, viz.: The
entire property, stock, furniture, and fixtures, and other articles, now in
and upon said premises, together with all debts and book accounts,
assets, and effects of every kind and nature, belonging to said finn of J.

104. See Morgan v. Rogers, 19 F. 596, 597-98 (Cir. Ct. D.R.I. 1884) (Both copyright and
trademark mortgages began developing in the late nineteenth century).
105. See In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 886, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1921).
106. Id. at 888 ("[A] further and conclusive reason for holding that the instrument does not
cover the good will and trade-marks is that they are not property which can be owned in gross.
They arise out of a particular business, and do not exist apart from that business .... As the
mortgage in question does not pretend to cover the company's business and franchises, it confers
no lien whatever upon the good will and trade-marks. If the company could not have sold its good
will and trade-marks apart from its business, it evidently could not mortgage them.").
107. See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 261 (1891).
108. See Morgan, 19 F. at 597-98.
109. Id. at 596.
110. Id. at 597.
111. Id. at 596-97.
112. Id. at 596.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 597-98.
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Miller & Sons.115
The court found that the language was broad in its terms and covered the
trademarks in the mortgage grant."6 Given that the loan was large in value at the
time of the conveyance, the court stated there was no reason that Miller & Sons'
entire property was not inclusive of the trademarks for security purposes. 17
Moreover, although trademarks were "an abstract right" and could not be sold
apart from the associated business, trademarks may be bought and sold like other
property if the underlying business was included." 8 Here, the mortgagee
succeeded to all of the rights in Miller & Sons' business, took possession of the
business through agency, and gained rights to "use the trade-marks, and to
manufacture and sell the medicinal compounds." ' 9 Therefore, the court declared
that "[t]o hold that the trade-mark is not included in this mortgage, is to say the
most valuable part of the partnership property is not covered by the words assets
and effects of every kind and nature."' 2 °
Because the mortgagee would only turn over the property to Miller & Sons
after they had fulfilled their obligation, the mortgage "cannot operate to divest
[the mortgagee] of the exclusive right to the trade-marks if they had acquired such
under the mortgage."1 '' Accordingly, only the mortgagee had the exclusive right
to the trademarks and the defendant had no right to use them. 22
'
The Morgan decision demonstrated that a typical trademark mortgage at that
time required the mortgagee's possession of the mortgagor's entire business
associated with the trademark.23 The mortgagee employed an agent to succeed
to the mortgagor's business.'2 4 There was no recording of the trademark
mortgage.' 25 Consequently, unlike patents, trademarks could not be easily
mortgaged because the mortgagor must transfer the associated business to the
mortgagee as part of the transaction, and the mortgagee must then take possession
of the mortgagor's business.'26

115. Id. at 597.
116. Id.("The clause of conveyance in the mortgage is very broad in its terms.").
117. Id.
118. Id. ("There is no reason why a trade-mark cannot be conveyed with the property with
which it is associated. As an abstract right, apart from the article manufactured, a trade-mark
,cannot be sold, the reason being that such transfer would be productive of fraud upon the public.
In this respect it differs from a patent or a copyright. But in connection with the article produced,
it may be bought and sold like other property. It constitutes a part of partnership assets, and is
properly sold with the firm property.").
119. Id.at 598.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.at 597.
124. Id. at 598.
125. Id. at 597.
126. Id. at 598.
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Moreover, while both patent and copyright statutory provisions explicitly
allowed patents 127 and copyrights'28 to be used in chattel mortgages, the trademark
statute did not include a similar provision. 129 Trademarks themselves, apart from
the associated business, were excluded from mortgages. 30
The rationale for the exclusion was due to the strong belief that a trademark
cannot be transferred in gross without the associated business. 3 ' For example,
in Mendes v. New EnglandDuplicating Co., the plaintiff, owner of the Paddy
Company, had developed the Paddy mark in connection with the manufacturing
and selling of collating machines. 3 2 The plaintiff brought a trademark
infringement claim against New England Duplicating Co. for the use of the Paddy
mark in advertisements in trade periodicals.' 33 The defendant asserted that it had
the right to use the mark, relying on the mortgage on all of the Paddy Company's
assets, trademarks, and goodwill as the basis of its authority to use the Paddy
trademark.' 34 Specifically, the defendant had entered into an agreement with a
third party, Herbits, for the distribution and advertisement of collating machines
to be produced by Herbits under the Paddy mark.'35 "[Herbits] purported to have
the right to use the Paddy name by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed by
[Paddy] on all its assets and goodwill."' 3 6 The district court stated that
trademarks and goodwill are "species of property [that] cannot be owned in gross
and therefore cannot be sold or transferred apart from the franchise and the
on the trademarks
business of the company.' 137
38 Therefore, the mortgage
themselves was held invalid.
The court in Mendes strictly followed an earlier case, In re Leslie-Judge Co.,
decided by the Second Circuit in 1921 .13' The relevant provision for property

127. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2014) ("[A]n assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date
of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.").
128. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014) (defining "transfer ofcopyright ownership" as "an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of
a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited
in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.").
129. See In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 886, 888 (2nd Cir. 1921) (discussing the absence of
trademark statutory provisions for mortgages on trademarks).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Mendes v. New England Duplicating Co., 94 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D. Mass. 1950).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 561.
135. Id. at 560.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 561.
138. Id. (holding that the chattel mortgage did not and could not convey any trade-mark rights
of the Paddy Machine Company).
139. See In re Leslie-Judge Co. 272 F. 886 (2d Cir. 1921).
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covered by the mortgage transaction in that case stated:
All goods and chattels wherever situated, including plant, machinery,
equipment, supplies of all kinds, furniture, and all personal and other
property, property rights, good will, copyrights, trade-marks, and choses
in action of every kind whatsoever, as now owned or which may
hereafter be acquired or owned by the company, and also all the estate,
right, title, interest, property, possession, income, and demand
whatsoever, as well in law as in equity of the company, to have and to
hold the same and every part thereof. 4 °
The mortgagor later filed for bankruptcy.' The district court ordered the bank's
property to be sold free of the mortgage that the mortgagor company had signed
on August 1, 1909, to the Title Guarantee & Trust Company to secure an amount
of $700,000.142 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision because
mortgages on trademarks were not permissible due to the fact that trademarks
"are not property which can be owned in gross," as "[t]hey arise out of a
particular business, and do not exist apart from that business.' ' 143 Therefore, "[i]f
the company could not have sold its good will and trade-marks apart from its
business, it evidently could not mortgage them."'"
The early prohibition of trademark mortgages began to dissipate as courts
adopted a modem view of goodwill and allowed transfers and assignments of
trademarks apart from the business.1 45 For example, in Glamorene Products
Corp. v. Procter& Gamble Co., Stauffer Chemical Company assigned the mark
"BOUNCE" for dry-cleaning detergent to Procter & Gamble. 146 The grant recited
that the assignment was together with the goodwill of the business. 47 There was
no transfer of the associated business as Stauffer continued to operate and retain
the tangible assets of the business. 41 Upon receiving the assignment, Procter &
Gamble used the mark on its own dry-cleaning detergent.'4 9 The court found the
assignment valid; the trademarks along with attached goodwill can be assigned

140. Id. at 887.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 888; see also President Suspender Co. v. MacWilliam, 238 F. 159, 162 (2d Cir.
1916) ("A trade-mark right cannot exist independently of some business in which it is used. The
sole function of a trade-mark being to indicate the origin or ownership of the goods, it cannot exist
apart from the business to which its use is incident. There is no such right known to the law as an
exclusive ownership in a trade-mark apart from the right to use it in a business. It cannot exist as
a right in gross.").
144. In re Leslie-Judge, 272 F. at 888.
145. See Glamorene Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 538 F.2d 894, 895 (C.C.P.A.
1976); see also Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin. Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 678 (7th Cir. 1982).
146. Glamorene Prods., 538 F.2d at 895.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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separately from the business. 5 ° Consequently, trademarks and their attached
goodwill can also be used as security in mortgages without the associated
business. 151
II. MOVING

FROM IP MORTGAGE TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS

From the end of World War II to 1970, the United States experienced
significant economic growth.' 52 Not surprisingly, the nation also embarked on
major changes in the law in order to facilitate the postwar boom.' The Uniform
Commercial Code was promulgated in 1952 in an effort to bring uniformity to
commercial law across the states and to facilitate and increase daily transactions
in commerce. 154 In 1962, with the promulgation of the Official Text of Article 595
of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC-9"), modem financing law was born.1
Article 9 eliminated antiquated distinctions among security devices, including
mortgages, pledges, conditional sales, factor, warehousing and others, with a

150. Id.
151. Id. at 895-96 (stating that "transfer of tangible assets (inventory, labels, customer lists,
formulas, etc.) is not necessary to an effective trademark assignment") (citing Sterling Brewers, Inc.
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 441 F.2d 675 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 303
F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). Moreover, the liberal trends relating to trademark assignments without
the transfer of tangible assets spill over to the area of trademark licensing. Xuan-Thao Nguyen,
Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1267, 1281 (2004) (stating that courts have
relaxed the requirement on quality control and allowed trademark owners to satisfy the quality
control requirement by choosing various means for indirect and direct control without fear of
trademark abandonment).
152. See, e.g., CHARLES GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS: INSIDE THE GREAT WALL STREET
MONEY DYNASTIES 274-85 (2002) (describing the economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s). The
economic growth in the post-war years also impacted real estate transactions, as more people
moved to suburban houses. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exits, Suburbs as Entrance, 106
MiCH. L. REV. 277,282 (2007) (stating that the "postwar economic boom enabled more people than
ever before to choose a suburban life").
153. See Miek Berends, An Elusive Profession?Lawyers in Society, 26 LAW & SoC'Y REV.
161, 181 (1992) (stating that the "postwar economic boom and the resulting economic and legal
expansion led to dramatic changes in the scale of markets, industries, commerce, and economic
relations. These increased the market for legal work as did the growth of welfare states, their
subsequent expansion of legislation, and the need for legal services").
154. Robert Braucher, Uniform Commercial Code-Documents of Title, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
831, 831 (1954) (indicating that Article 7 of the UCC "deals comprehensively with documents of
title; it is designed to replace the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act, and sections 27-40 of the Uniform Sales Act").
155. Although the UCC was promulgated in 1952, the official text ofArticle 9 became official
in 1962 for states to adopt. Donald W. Baker, The Ambiguous NotificationRequirement ofRevised
UCC Section 9-312(3): Inventory FinancersBeware!, 98 BANKING L. J. 4, 4 (1981) (noting that
the 1962 official text of Article 9 "was in force in every state except one").
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unitary system of secured transaction law. 56 The unitary system covers all
transactions, regardless of form, that create security interests in personal property
(that is, property other than real estate).' 57 Prior to the adoption of UCC-9, there
was no single body of law that governed liens in personal property.'58 Each state
had its own statutes and common law doctrines governing liens. 5 9 There was no
uniformity across the United States. 6 ° Article 9's unitary system has been an
enormous success and a crowning achievement for the National Conference of
on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") as all states have adopted
Commissioners
1
it.

16

The success of UCC-9 meant a reduction in transaction costs caused by
overlapping, opaque, and confusing security devices.' 62 The success of the law
meant the proliferation of secured transactions in the United States. 163 It also
meant an increase in financing using all different types of intellectual property,
including patents, copyrights and trademarks-increasingly valuable assets for
a company in modem time.' 64 Consequently, gone was the conditional

156. Appeal of Copeland, 531 F.2d 1195,1203 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting that "Article 9 simplifies
pre-Code secured financing by providing for the unitary treatment of all security arrangements. It
eliminates many of the antiquated distinctions between various security devices in favor of a single
security interest, §§ 9-102, 1-201(37), and a single set of rules regarding creation and perfection,
designed to govern any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures."); see also Eric J. Pullen, RevisedArticle 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code andAgriculturalLiens in Texas, 40 TEx. J. Bus. LAW 1, 8 (2004) (providing a
brief history of Article 9 and how it supplanted antiquated security devices of pledges, chattel
mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts and others with a single standardized security device).
157. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2014).
158. Pullen, supra note 156, at 8.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. (noting that Article 9 "explicitly superseded all previous legislation, which had up to
that point been a morass of security devices that had piled up over the years, in the states where it
was adopted. With the implementation of Article 9, a state would now have a single,
comprehensive system for the regulation of security interests in personal property.").
161. Id. ("Article 9 was adopted by almost every state with minimal modification by the end
of the 1960s.").
162. Levitin, supra note 15, at 695 ("By avoiding demonstrative formalities, Article 9 reduces
the transaction costs involved in securitizing mortgages."); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery
and Myth of 'OstensibleOwnership' andArticle9 Filing: A CritiqueofProposalsto Extend Filing
Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 683, 745-52 (1988) (discussing the benefits of UCC-9
system, including veracity of filing information, priority order, and reduction of discovery cost).
163. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC
Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 ClI.-KENT L. REv. 1357, 1397 (1999) ("[T]he very
success of Article 9 has resulted in a substantial increase in the sophistication of secured
transactions since the early years of the UCC.").
164. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, CollateralizingIntellectualProperty,42 GA.L.REv.
1, 16 (2007) (discussing the use of intellectual property assets as collateral in financing).
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assignment of patents and copyrights.165 The cumbersome practices discussed in
Waterman v. Mackenzie were no longer necessary; 66 the secured party or lender
need not demand assignments of patents or copyrights upfront with subsequent
return of the patents or copyrights to the borrower upon satisfaction of the
payment obligations.'6 7 Likewise, the practice of appointing an agent to take over
the possession of the borrower's business for purposes of trademark mortgages
became impractical and unnecessary. 6 s Under modem UCC-9 law, the borrower

or debtor continues to own and use the intellectual or other personal property for
the business operation.' 69 In doing so, the debtor would be able to make
payments to the secured party. 70
' There was no need for the secured party to have
assignment either directly or via an agent. 7' UCC-9 law protects the secured
party's interest without the antiquated, cumbersome practices.'72
During a period of major change in state commercial law across the nation,
Congress overhauled trademark law in 1946, patent law in 1952, and copyright
law in 1976.1 3 These historic milestones brought intellectual property law to
modem time, recognizing the significant role of intellectual property in the
economy.
Soon, modem UCC-9 law intersected with modem intellectual property law,
raising new questions that required courts to address intellectual property issues
within the spirit of UCC-9's functional approach. 74 Because UCC-9 is a creature

165. Weinberg & Woodward, supranote 16, at 65-66 ("Although pre-U.C.C. law was in some
respects similar to the traditional methods f6r employing patents and trademarks as collateral,
Article 9 changed the very vocabulary of secured lending. For example, no longer would one get
security from a 'chattel mortgage' or 'conditional sale'; 'security interest' became the term to
embrace all forms of secured lending on personal property.").
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920-21 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) ("The UCC
created a single security device, which was not dependent on who had title to the property. [Article
9] applies to secured transactions involving personal property regardless of 'whether title to
collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor.' Because transferring title no longer has
significance in creating a security interest in personal property, most security interests created after
adoption of the UCC do not involve the transfer of title.") (citations omitted).
168. Weinberg & Woodward, supranote 16, at 65-66 (explaining how UCC-9's new approach
differs from the traditional conditional assignments of intellectual property).
169. Id. at 66 (noting that under UCC-9 "the location of title is immaterial").
170. Id. at 122.
171. Id.at 65-66.

172. Id.
173. Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946, the Patent Act in 1952, and the Copyright Act
in 1976. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
127, 433, 764 (Walters Kluwer Law & Business eds., 6th ed. 2012).
174. Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 16, at 62-64. ("Uncertainty and confusion probably
always have existed about the employment of intellectual property as collateral for a loan. Since
the drafting of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, an uneasy coexistence of state and
federal law has developed. Both state and federal law now arguably apply when a debtor attempts
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of state law, questions arose related to the manner to perfect the security interests
in patents, copyrights and trademarks as collateral.' 75 Specifically, the question
arose as to whether federal or state recording regimes would be applicable to
govern security interests in intellectual property.'76 These questions have direct
impact on the secured party's rights against other secured parties, lenders, and
third parties.'77 How courts addressed these questions would either encourage or
hinder access to credit for businesses and individuals with intellectual property
as collateral.
A. A New Approach to Perfection of Patents Collateral
In Waterman v. Mackenzie, the United States Supreme Court enunciated that
patent conditional assignments or mortgages recorded with the Patent Office have
the equivalent of possession of the patents. 178 The practice to protect security
interests in patents at that time was to file the conditional assignment or
mortgages with the Patent Office. 7 9 Financing practices, however, have changed
substantially in modern time.
In modern time, the grant of a security interest in personal property, including
patents, is understood as not an outright transfer of ownership in the property.'80
Secured financing no longer requires title or ownership of the collateral
property. 8 ' Indeed, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code comment to
section 9-101 provides:
This article does not determine whether "title" to the collateral is in the.
secured party or in the debtor and adopts neither a "title theory" nor a
and remedies
"lien theory" of security interests. Rights, obligations
82
under the Article do not depend on a location of title.
Several courts, which understood that the functional approach to modern
financing law was that the grant of a security interest would not effectuate a
transfer of present ownership in the patent, held that such a grant is not required
to be recorded with the Patent Office.' 83 The Patent Office's filing system is for

to use a patent or trademark to secure a loan. The extent to which each body of law is applicable
and the interaction between the two systems was left unclear by the drafters of Article 9 and has
not been clarified by Congress. The radical differences between the state and federal systems, both
conceptually and as implemented, further complicate the uncertainty in the law.").
175. Id.
176. Id. at 73-74.
177. Id. at 65-67.
178. Waterman v. Mackenziel38 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1891).
179. Id. at 260.
180. See U.C.C. § 9-202 (2014).
181. Id. (stating that "the provisions ofthis article with regard to rights and obligations apply
whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor").
182. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 9 (1973).
183. See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); City
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assignments or transfer of titles.."4
For example, in City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., the bank
provided loans to Otto Fabric and received a security interest in "all contract
rights, receivables and general intangibles" in 1983.185 The bank immediately
filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State in Kansas. 186 Two years
later Otto Fabric and the bank signed a new security agreement wherein the
debtor provided to the bank security interest in several assets, including three
patents. 187 As part of the secured transaction, the debtor promised to assign the
patents for collateral purposes.' 88 The bank recorded the financing statement with
the Secretary of State in Kansas in early January 1985 and filed the patent
assignments with the Patent Office a few days later. 89 In April 1985, the debtor
filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee sought to set aside the bank's security
interest in the patents because the assignment was filed outside the ninety day
preference period.' 9 The bankruptcy court granted the bank relief on the other
assets, except the three patents serving as collateral, because the bank timely
perfected the security interest in the other assets within the ninety day preference
period.' 9' The bank appealed.' 92
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision. 93 The court
noted that the relevant federal patent statutory provision does not completely
preempt the recording of a security interest in patents.' Specifically, the statute
does not expressly require the filing of an assignment with the Patent and
Trademark Office in order to perfect a security interest in patents. 95 Also, the
court observed Congress has amended patent law numerous times "since the
advent of96modem commercial law" but chose not to completely preempt the field
of filing. 1
Most importantly, the Court observed that if the filing requirement with the
Patent Office exists, "which is considered an absolute assignment," it would

Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 782-83 (D. Kan. 1988).
184. In re Cybernetic, 239 B.R. at 920; Otto Fabric,83 B.R. at 782.
185. Otto Fabric,83 B.R. at 780.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 781.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 782.
194. Id. ("[W]hile the federal statute may preempt in part the system for perfecting security
interests in patents, it is only a partial preemption. It leaves open a state filing to protect one's
security interest in a patent against a lien creditor.").
195. Id. ("[T]he federal statute does not expressly state that one must file an assignment with
the Patent and Trademark Office to perfect a security interest.").
196. Id. ("The [patent] statute has been amended since the advent of modem commercial law.
If Congress intended to preempt the field of filing, it could have said so.").
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reduce the financing with patents as collateral. 197 For example, the court
provided, "a patentee or his assigns could not grant a license after using the patent
as collateral for a loan if the secured lender filed the security agreement with the
Patent Office."' 198 The only way for the patentee to be able to license to others is
to request permission from the lender.' 99 Also, without the rights to the patent
after the assignment, the only way the patentee could bring a lawsuit is to join the
lender as an indispensable party.200 In summary, the court asserted that the desire
to impose a rule for a federal, central filing system of patent collateral will not be
rational, convenient, or consistent with modem financing and Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.2"' That means the single, federal system will
diminish financing with patents as collateral.20 2 Therefore, City Bank & Trust
Co. indeed had perfected its security interest in the patents within the ninety days
preference, like the other collateral in the transaction.2 3
B. New Approaches to Copyright Collateral
The growth in the entertainment and software industries spurred financing for
the creation and distribution of new content.2" A number of court cases focused
on the perfection of security interests in copyrights of films in these industries,
forcing a close examination of whether federal law or state law governs when the
secured creditors file the security interest in copyrights. 20 5 The filing question is
significantly important. 2 6 Filing in the wrong office renders the security interest

197. Id. at 783.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 780.
202. Id.
203. In later years, courts continued to rule that perfection of security in patents collateral is
with UCC-9. See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999).
204. Banks have been providing financing in the movie industry since the 1920's. See
Anousha Sakoui, Star-StruckBankers Return to Hollywood to FinanceMovies, BLOOMBERG (June
19,2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-19/star-struck-bankers-retum-to-hollywoodto-finance-movies.html, archivedathttp://perma.cc/LJ6J-FUSX (reporting that JPMorgan has been
working with the studios since the 1920s).
205. See, e.g., Paul A. Baumgarten, Copyrightsas Collateral: PerfectionFinally Perfected
After Peregrine?,71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 581 (1994); Lorin Brennan, FinancingIntellectual
Property Under FederalLaw: A National Imperative, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 195
(2001); Gary 0. Concoff, Motion Picture Secured Transactionsunder the Uniform Commercial
Code: Problems in Perfection, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1214 (1966); Steven Weinberger, Note,
Perfectionof SecurityInterest in Copyrights: The PeregrineEffect on the Orion PicturesPlan of
Reorganization, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 959 (1993).
206. See Justin M. Vogel, Note, Perfecting Security Interests in UnregisteredCopyrights:
Preemptionof the Federal Copyright Act and How Filing in Accordance with Article 9 Leads to
the Creation of a Bankruptcy "Force Play," 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 463, 466 (2002)
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unperfected, losing priority to other creditors. 20 7 In other words, the secured
creditor without proper perfection cannot recover on the money loaned to the
borrower; other creditors would get paid first from the pool that is already small
due to the borrower's dire financial condition.2 8
A line of court decisions on perfection of copyright collateral began with the
controversial decision In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.2 ° 9 In that case,
National Peregrine, Inc. ("NPI") filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in 1989.210
Prior to the bankruptcy filing, NPI was in the entertainment industry, developing
and distributing television programs.2 ' NPI's principal assets consisted primarily
of copyrights, distribution rights and licenses of films, and account receivables
arising from the licensing of the films. 2 12 To obtain financing for its business,
NPI's predecessor by merger entered into a credit line agreement with Capitol
Federal Savings and Loan Association of Denver ("Cap Fed") for $6,000,000 in
June 1985.213 The credit was secured by NPI's assets, including "[a]ll inventory
consisting of films and all accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, general
intangibles, instruments, equipment, and documents
related to such inventory,
2 14
now owned or hereafter acquired by the Debtor.
Cap Fed filed its UCC-1 financing statement in California, Colorado, and
Utah to perfect its security interest in NPI's assets. 2' It did not file with the
United States Copyright Office with respect to the copyrights.2 16
As debtor-in-possession under Chapter 11, NPI filed a complaint against Cap
Fed, asserting that the bank failed to file its security interest in the copyrights and
the account receivables generated by the licensing and distribution of the films
with the Copyright Office.2 17 Due to the bank's lack of perfection of the security
interest, NPI claimed that it enjoyed ajudicial lien on the copyrights and account
receivables thereunder. 28 The bankruptcy court held for Cap Fed, and NPI
appealed to the district court.219 Kozinski, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation,
reversed. 220 The judge cited to the federal copyright policy for a central, uniform
system of recording security interests in copyrights and held that Cap Fed's filing

(discussing the importance of perfection of security interest in copyrights).
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. In re Peregrine Entm't,Ltd., 116 B.R.194 (Bankr.C.D. Cal. 1996).
210. Id. at 198.
211. Id. at 197.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 197-98.
215. Id. at 198.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id
220. Id.at 207.
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in the states' offices failed to provide notice to third parties. 22' Accordingly,
222 NPI,
as debtor-in-possession, avoided Cap Fed's unperfected security interest.
The National Peregrine decision was controversial because the security
interest in that case included intangibles related to copyrights, which both
commentators and courts called into doubt.223 Subsequent decisions, however,
narrowed and modified the NationalPeregrineholding.224
The court in National Peregrine did not distinguish between registered
copyrights and unregistered copyrights. 225 The majority of copyrights are not
registered with the United States Copyright Office. 226 That does not mean that the
unregistered copyrights are not protected under federal copyright law. 27
Copyright protections begin at the time of completion, regardless of
registration, 228 and it is not practical to require authors to register all works of
authorship.2 29 Consequently, copyright owners do not feel the need to register
their copyrights, as they are still able to exploit their copyrights and use them as
collateral in secured transactions.23 °
In Aerocon EngineeringInc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (also known as In re
World Auxiliary Power Co.), the debtors borrowed money from Silicon Valley

221. Id. at 201-02.
222. Id. at 207.
223. See In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002); MCEG
Sterling, Inc. v. Phillips Nizer Benjamin Krim & Ballon Eyeglasses, 646 N.Y.S.2d 778,780 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1996); In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. 439,441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998); Schuyler
M. Moore, "EntertainmentBankruptcies: The CopyrightAct Meets the Bankruptcy Code," 48 Bus.
LAW. 567, 571-72 (1993) (stating that the holding in National Peregrine was "somewhat
questionable because the assets in question were not themselves copyrights. A license and related
receivable seem analogous to an installment note for the sale of land. Security interests in such
installment notes are perfected under the U.C.C., not under real property recording statutes").
224. See In re WorldAuxiliary, 303 F.3d at 1131; In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 244 B.R.
149, 253-56 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1999).
225. See In re World Auxiliary, 303 F.3d at 1129 (noting that the Peregrine court did not
specify that the copyrights for collateral were registered or unregistered).
226. Id. at 1131 (stating that the Copyright Act contemplates that most copyrights will not be
registered).
227. Id.
228. Id. (noting that the Copyright Act provides "copyrights 'may' be registered, implying that
they don't have to be, and since a fee is charged and time and effort is required, the statute sets up
a regime in which most copyrights won't ever be registered") (citations omitted). Typically,
registration is necessary for litigation and remedies purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 41 1(a) (2014).
229. See id ("Since copyright is created every time people set pen to paper, or fingers to
keyboard, and affix their thoughts in a tangible medium, writers, artists, computer programmers,
and web designers would have to have their hands tied down to keep them from creating
unregistered copyrights all day every day.").
230. Id. (noting that the Copyright Act contemplates that most copyrights will not be
registered); see also 17 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2014) (permitting, but not requiring, registrations of
copyrights).
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Bank and signed a security agreement to secure the loan. 231 - The security
agreement granted the bank a security interest in copyrights embodied in
drawings, blueprints, and computer software.232 The debtors did not register their
copyrights with the Copyright Office. 233 The bank then filed a UCC-l financing
statement with the Secretary of State of California where the debtors were
located. 234 Thereafter, the debtors filed for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court
approved the trustee's sale of the bankruptcy estate's assets, including the
copyrights and the trustee's avoidance power to Aerocon Engineering.235
Aerocon brought an action against the bank, seeking to avoid the security interest
court ruled for the bank. 2 7
of the bank in the copyrights.236 The23 bankruptcy
8
Aerocon appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished NationalPeregrine239 and rejected two other
lower court's decisions that had extended National Peregrine's holding to
perfection of security interest in unregistered copyrights24 for several reasons.2 4
National Peregrine and subsequent decisions concerned only the manner of
perfection of security interest in copyrights; they did not address unregistered
copyrights.242 Also, the Copyright Office's recordation system is only for
registered copyrights; none is available for unregistered copyrights.243 Moreover,
the Copyright Act contains no express provision prohibiting a secured party from
perfecting its security interest in unregistered copyrights under the state law
system. 2' Therefore, the court held that there was no federal preemption of
perfection of security interests in unregistered copyrights.245
Consequently, if a copyright is registered, the recording of a security interest
in the registered copyright is with the Copyright Office.246 If the copyright is
unregistered, UCC-9 filing system applies.247 Most importantly, the court warned

231. Id. at 1123.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1123-24.
236. Id. at 1124.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1125.
240. Id. at 1130 (rejecting In re AEG Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991),
aff'd, 161 B.R. 50 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1993); In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1997)).
241. Id. at 1127-28.
242. Id. at 1128-30.
243. Id. at 1131.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1128.
246. Id. at 1128 (adopting Peregrine's holding applicable only to registered copyrights
collateral).
247. Id.
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that without an approach for perfecting security interests in unregistered
copyrights, "no lender would lend against unregistered copyrights if they couldn't
perfect their security interest. 2 48 Unregistered copyrights "have value as
collateral," but without a system to perfect their security interest "they would
have no value at all. 249
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the boom in the software industry means
that more copyrights in software will be used as collateral and after-acquired
collateral in secured transactions.
Imposing the burden of registration for
copyrights before they can be used as collateral in financing would cause a heavy
burden on software developers:
If software developers had to register copyrights in their software before
using it as collateral, the last half hour of the day for a software company
would be spent preparing and mailing utterly pointless forms to the
Copyright Office to register and record security interests. Our reading
of the law "promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by
preserving the collateral value of unregistered copyrights, which is to
say, the vast majority of copyrights.25 1
Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of Silicon
Valley Bank.252
In summary, the cases discussed above allow both registered and unregistered
copyrights to serve as collateral in financing. 253 The courts recognized the growth
in a new medium of copyrights, particularly software copyrights, and refined its
approaches to ensure the ease of financing for both existing and new creative
content industries.254
C. A New Approach to Trademarks Collateral
Modem commercial law, especially Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code in which old security devices were replaced with a simple and unified
structure for secured transactions in order to encourage secured financing across
the United States, has an impact on the use of trademarks as collateral in
financing. 255 Also, as courts adopted modem trends in permitting the assignments
of trademarks without the underlying business, trademarks can be transferred
separately.25 6 These new developments opened the door for trademarks to be

248. Id. at 1132.
249. Id.
250. Id.

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. In re Peregrine Entm't, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 207 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); World
Auxiliary, 303 F.3d at 1128.
254. In re Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 207; World Auxiliary, 303 F.3d at 1128.
255. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 163, at 1397; Pullen, supra note 156, at 9.
256. See Glamorene Prods. Corp. v. Procter &Gamble Co., 538 F.2d 894, 895-96 (C.C.P.A.
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used as collateral in financing.257 Soon, cases involving security interests in
trademarks reached the court.258
The first case that addressed the perfection of trademark collateral was In re
Roman CleanserCo.259 The Roman Cleanser Company, a Michigan corporation,
was in the business of manufacturing, packaging and marketing household
cleaning products under the trademark "Roman" and other marks. 260 All of the
marks were federally registered. 261' Roman then filed for bankruptcy. 26 2 The
bankruptcy trustee sold the federally registered trademarks, formulas, and
customer lists to Michlin Chemical Corporation for $180,000.263 After the sale,
National Acceptance Company of America ("NAC") sought to intervene,
claiming that it had senior, perfected security interest in the trademarks.2 64 The
facts revealed that a few years before bankruptcy, Roman granted NAC a security
interest "in and to all of Roman Cleanser's then owned and thereafter acquired
goods, equipment, and general intangibles and the proceeds thereof as collateral
for the payment of all indebtedness and liabilities then existing or thereafter
arising of Roman Cleanser to NAC. ' 2 65 This grant was part of a loan and security
agreement.266 NAC timely filed a financing statement with the Michigan
Secretary of State. 267 The trustee opposed on the ground that NAC did not file a
conditional assignment of the federally registered trademark with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office and that NAC's security interest was
therefore unperfected. 68
The bankruptcy court held for NAC. 269 The court distinguished an
assignment from a security interest of a trademark.270 On the one hand, an
assignment means absolute transfer of all right, title and interest to the trademark,
whereas a security interest is not.27' Indeed, on the other hand, a security interest
is "merely what the term suggests-a device to secure an indebtedness ... [i]t is
a mere agreement to assign in the event of a default by the debtor."27

1976); see also Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin. Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 678 (7th Cir. 1982).
257. See generallyIn re Roman Cleanser, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussing trademarks
used as collateral in financing).
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 208.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 210.
269. Id. at 208.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 210.
272. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting the Bankruptcy Court's
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Consequently, a promise to assign a trademark is not an absolute transfer of the
trademark covered by the federal trademark law.273 Federal trademark law
governs the transfers of trademarks and requires filing such transfers.274 State
law, not federal trademark law, governs the manner of perfecting a security
interest in trademarks.275
In the original bankruptcy proceedings, the court also noted that if Congress
intended to provide "a means for recording security interests in trademarks in
addition to assignments, it would have been simple to so state. 276 Moreover, the
court reasoned that a federal, central filing for all security interests in trademarks
would not further Congress' concern in passing the federal Lanham Act
trademark law for protecting the public from the deceptive use of trademarks
because a secured creditor with only a security interest in the trademark collateral
does not have the right to use the trademark absent debtor default on the loan.277
The Sixth Circuit subsequently affirmed the lower court's decision.27
Subsequent cases have adopted both "the logic and holding" of the Roman
Cleansercourt.279 Some courts offered strong public policy reasons for how a
federal filing system under the Lanham Act for security interests in trademarks
would not encourage financing.28 °
III. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND IP MORTGAGES
Following the Waterman v. Mackenzie2 8' decision, intellectual property
mortgages began to flourish, which was evidenced by the fact that not only
private creditors, but the United States Small Business Administration ("SBA")
provided loans secured by intellectual property. 2 In 1953, Congress passed the
Small Business Act to create SBA whose function was to "aid, counsel, assist and
'
protect, insofar as is possible, the interest of small business concerns."283
SBA

observation).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 212.
275. In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. 940, 946 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. In re Roman, 802 F.2d at 208.
279. See Trimarchi v. Together Dev. Corp., 255 B.R. 606, 611-12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000)
(noting cases).
280. See id.; In re TR-3 Industries, 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984); In re C.C. &
Co., Inc., 86 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R.
792, 795-96 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re 199Z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778, 781-82 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1992).
281. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 334 (1891).
282. See Brian W. Jacobs, Using IntellectualPropertyto Secure Financingafter the Worst
FinancialCrisisSince the GreatDepression, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 449, 451 (2011).
283. Our History, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-do/
history (last visited Oct. 10, 2014), archivedat http://perma.cc/J3Y2-3 EJQ.
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provides loans, loan guarantees, and counseling to small businesses across the
countries.284 Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc. is an illustrative example
of lending to small businesses 2and
taking intellectual property assets, including
85
patent applications, as security.
On November 21, 1961, Railex borrowed money from SBA and signed a
document wherein it transferred title of the patent applications to the SBA. 286 The
document provided that the assignment would be null and void if Railex fulfilled
its payment obligations pursuant to the promissory note.287 The note was due to
mature on November 21, 1971 .288 Railex, however, repaid the loan in full on July
31, 1964.289 On August 21, 1964, Railex brought a patent infringement suit
against Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc. 290 The defendants sought
291 to dismiss the suit,
arguing that SBA was the indispensable party to the suit.
The court observed that the conditional assignment of the patent applications
for security of the note was a mortgage transaction similar to the patent mortgage
transaction in the Waterman v. Mackenzie case. 292 The court recognized that
under Waterman, the mortgagee holding a patent enjoys the entire title, both
equitable title and legal title, to the patent collateral and can bring an infringement
suit against others. 293 The court, however, distinguished its facts from Waterman,
noting that the mortgagor in Waterman did not repay the loan at the time it filed
the patent infringement suit, whereas the mortgagor in the present case,294Railex,
had paid the loan in full prior to filing the patent infringement law suit.
Consequently, Railex reacquired equitable title to the mortgaged patents on

284. Id.
285. Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119 (D.D.C. 1966) aff'd, 382 F.2d
179 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also Magnuson Indus., Inc. v. Co-Rect Prods., Inc., No. 4-78-112,1981
WL 48193, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 1981) (finding that the transaction between Conry did not
"involve usual type of patent assignment because the SBA held title to the patent only as a
mortgagee. When the loan debt was compromised, it relinquished its rights as mortgagee by
returning to Conry the written instrument of assignment.").
286. Railex Corp., 40 F.R.D. at 122.
287. Id. at 121 (noting that the document signed by Railex contained relevant provisions for
the conditional assignment of the patent applications: "Provided always, and this assignment is
made upon the express condition that if the Assignor shall punctually and fully pay or cause to be
paid unto SBA the full amount payable upon or with respect to said note, according to its terms,
together with interest thereon * * * this assignment shall be null and void, and said Letters Patent
and applications for Letters Patent shall be reassigned to the Assignor but shall otherwise remain
in full force and effect.").
288. Id.
289. Id. at 122 (noting that the promissory note "was stamped 'PAID', signed, and dated by
the authorized SBA certifying officer on that date").
290. Id. at 121.
291. Id. at 122-23.
292. Id. at 122.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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July 31, 1964, when the loan from the SBA was repaid in full.295 SBA continued
to hold the bare legal title in the mortgaged patents until April 26, 1965.296 SBA
held the bare legal title after Railex paid off the loan and before the total release
of the "assignment" pursuant to the instrument, "as constructive trustee for the
benefit of plaintiff-mortgagor, but no longer as security for the SBA loan, which
had been repaid in full on July 31, 1964.,,297 Therefore, Railex had standing to
bring the infringement suit against the defendants and SBA, "as holder of bare
legal title to the patents in suit" as of the complaint filing date, "is neither an
indispensable nor a necessary 298
party in the present" patent infringement suit "in
the nature of a suit in equity.
This case is important on several fronts. It shows that small businesses are
in need of financing. 299 Access to credit is crucial to the survival of the
business. °° It demonstrates that small businesses do not have the real estate
property for security of loans.3"" What small businesses do have is intellectual
property. 0 2 When making loans to small businesses, SBA and private lending
institutions recognize this reality and take intellectual property, including patent
applications, as security for loans. 0 3 In addition, this case follows Waterman v.
Mackenzie to vest the intellectual property mortgagee with the entire title in the
mortgaged intellectual property during the time the intellectual property serves

295. Id.
296. Id. ("Legal title, however, continued to be held by mortgagee SBA until April 26, 1965,
at which time legal title was reassigned to the plaintiff-mortgagor by SBA with a provision in this
second assignment that 'this assignment includes the right to sue and recover for past
infringements, against all persons or parties except the United States Government and its
Agencies.").
297. Id. at 122-23.
298. Id. at 126; see also id. at 123 ("In the present case plaintiff has prayed for injunctive relief
and for an equitable accounting for profits, as well as incidental legal relief in the form of an award
of money damages, and this case is, therefore, essentially a civil non-jury action for patent
infringement in the nature of a suit in equity.").
299. See generally id. (showing that the SBA, in providing financing to smaller businesses,
resorted to the intellectual property of said companies as securities for their loans).
300. The United States government recognized that businesses were hurt by the Great
Depression. Our History, supra note 283. In 1932, which was before the SBA was in existence,
the government created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to lend to big businesses.
Id. (explaining early versions of SBA). RFC, in its lending practices, took intellectual property
assets, among other property, as security for loans. See Horowitz v. Kaplan, 193 F.2d 64, 69 (1st
Cir. 1951) ("RFC loan was reduced to the sum of $1,500,000 by payments on account, the balance
of the loan being extended to December 31, 1960, secured solely by a mortgage on the plant,
machinery, equipment, good will, trade-marks and patents of the debtor.").
301. SeeRailex Corp., 40 F.R.D. at 121-22.
302. See id.
303. See generallyHorowitz, 193 F.2d at 69 (demonstrating that RFC issued a loan which was
secured in part by a mortgage on the trademarks and patents of the debtor).
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as security for the outstanding loan."° In other words, the ruling in this case
encourages financing secured by intellectual property assets.3" 5
IV. SECURED PARTY OF IP COLLATERAL AS OWNER BY OPERATION OF LAW

Modem secured transactions law specifies what the secured party's rights are
in the event the debtor fails to fulfill payment obligation or is in default. 30 6 The
secured party can foreclose on the collateral and dispose of the collateral for
purposes of recovering as much as it can on the loan.30 7 With tangible collateral,
the secured party can enter the debtor's premise and seize the collateral as long
as the repossession is conducted without breaching the peace.3"' Alternatively,
the secured party can obtain a judicial order to repossess the collateral, but this
process is both costly and inefficient.30 9 Upon having the possession of the
collateral, the secured party can conduct either a public or private sale of the
collateral.310 With intellectual property collateral, foreclosure has its own
challenges.3 11 Repossession with the self-help method for tangible property
cannot be applied to intellectual property as they are intangible in nature.3" 2 The
question, then, is must the secured party request that the debtor execute an
assignment of the foreclosed intellectual property to the secured party and record
the assignment with the Patent Office before the secured party can transfer the
intellectual property to a purchaser? What should the law be in addressing the
above challenge in order to encourage financing with intellectual property as
collateral?
The case Sky Technologies v. SAP is both instructive and contributive in the

304. See supranote 29 and accompanying text (explaining that the mortgagee holds entire title
to the patents acting as a security).
305. See Railex Corp., 40 F.R.D. at 121-22.
306. See generally U.C.C. § 9, Pt. 6 (2000).
307. Id. § 9-610 ("After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose
of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially reasonable
preparation or processing.").
308. Id. § 9-609 (providing that after default, "a secured party: (1) may take possession of the
collateral"... pursuant to judicial process; or without judicial process, if it proceeds without
breach of the peace").
309. Mark G. Yudof,Reflections on PrivateRepossession,PublicPolicyandthe Constitution,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 954, 964-65 (1974) (reporting that the cost of replacing self-help repossession
with judicial means would be $143 million per year); James White, The Abolition of Self-Help
Repossession: The PoorPayEven More, 1973 WIs. L. REv. 503,520-22 (conducting seminal costbenefit study of self-help repossession).
310. U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (2000) ("If commercially reasonable, a secured party may dispose of
collateral by public or private proceedings").
311. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089,1120 (1998).
312. Id.
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development of the intellectual property secured financing law.313 In Sky
Technologies, Ozro, Inc. owned a portfolio of patents and sought financing from
Silicon Valley Bank ("SVB").314 On April 1, 2001, Ozro executed an Intellectual
Property Security Agreement with SVB, granting the bank a "security interest in
all of Grantor's right, title, and interest, whether presently existing or hereafter
acquired in, to and under all of the Collateral., 3 5 The collateral included the
patent portfolio, and SVB filed the agreement with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office on the same day.316
On the next day, Ozro signed a similar security agreement with Cross
Atlantic Capital Partners, Inc. ("XACP"). 317 The security agreement contained
identical provisions as the agreement between Ozro and SVB.318 In both
agreements, Ozro used the patent portfolio as collateral to secure the loans.319 In
the event of default by Ozro on the loans, both SVB and XACP have "the right
to exercise all the remedies of a secured party upon such default under the
Massachusetts UCC," including the right to repossess and dispose the intellectual
property collateral.32 ° In addition, Ozro was required to "assemble the Intellectual
Property Collateral and any tangible property in which [SVB or XACP] has a
security interest and to make it available to [SVB or XACP]. 321
A year and a half later, in December 2002, SVB assigned its security interest
under the SVB Agreement with Ozro to XACP through a non-recourse
assignment, giving XACP all of the "right, title, and interest" formerly held by
SVB.322 XACP recorded the assignment with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.3 23 XACP still held its own existing security interest in Ozro's
patent portfolio collateral.324
A few months later, Ozro defaulted on the loan, and XACP foreclosed on the
assets, including the patents. 25 On July 14, 2003, upon foreclosure and after
notifying all parties with interest in the patents, XACP sold the patents at public

313. Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
314. Id. at 1376.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1377.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. (noting that both agreements provide that the secured party: "(i) to take possession
of all or any portion of the Intellectual Property Collateral, (ii) to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose
of any or all of the Intellectual Property Collateral... and (iii) to exercise all or any of the rights,
remedies, powers, privileges and discretions under all or any of the documents relating to the
Secured Obligations").
321. Id. (alteration in original).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1378.
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auction.
XACP was the only bidder and purchased all of the assets, including
the patents. 327 During the foreclosure and disposition process, Ozro never
executed a written agreement assigning all of its rights, title or interests in the
assets, including the patents to XACP. 328 Subsequently, XACP assigned the
patents to Sky Technologies. 329 Three years later, in 2006, Sky Technologies
brought a patent infringement suit against SAP who then moved to dismiss the
suit, asserting that Sky Technologies had no standing because Ozro had never
assigned its rights in the patents to XACP.33 °
The district court held for Sky Technologies and granted SAP's Motion for
Certification of Question for Interlocutory Appeal to the Federal Circuit based on
a finding that "substantial grounds for difference of opinion exist regarding the
question of whether a transfer of title through operation of law without a written
33 1
assignment may apply in situations that do not involve heirs or probate law.",
The Federal Circuit emphasized that the central question was whether XACP
had right, title, and interest in the patents to transfer all of those rights to Sky
Technologies.332 The court looked to Massachusetts UCC Article 9 to determine
XACP's ownership in the patents.333 The court determined that under
Massachusetts UCC section 9-6 10, XACP, as a secured party, had the right to
dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner after the debtor,
Ozro, was in default. 334 XACP was allowed under Article 9 to purchase the
collateral at a public disposition. 335 Further, under UCC section 9-617, upon
acquiring the collateral at the disposition, the transferee for value takes all of the
debtor's rights in the collateral.336 Accordingly, "[b]ecause XACP foreclosed on
the patents-in-suit in conformity with these provisions, XACP obtained title to the
patents on July 14, 2003. ' ' 33 XACP became the new owner of the patents as
"[n]othing in the language of [Article 9] evinces the requirement that a writing
must exist to transfer patent rights through operation of law," and it properly
transferred its ownership to Sky Technologies. 38 The Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision that Sky Technologies had indeed become the new
owner of the patents through operation of law.339
The Federal Circuit provided policy justifications for permitting transfers of

326. Id.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1380-81; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 9-617 (West 2014).
Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1380.
Id. at 1381 (alteration added).
Id. at 1382.
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patent ownership through operation of law (i.e., foreclosure, disposition, and
purchase of patents under UCC Article 9) without the parties having to
memorialize the transaction in writing.340 Notably, the writing requirement would
negatively impact existing secured financing with patents as collateral, hinder
future financing with patent collateral, and impose burden on transactions:
First, if foreclosure on security interests secured by patent collateral
could not transfer ownership to the secured creditor, a large number of
patent titles presently subject to security interests may be invalidated.
Any secured creditor who maintained an interest in patent collateral
would be in danger of losing its rights in such collateral. Second, by
restricting transfer of patent ownership only to assignments, the value of
patents could significantly diminish because patent owners would be
limited in their ability to use patents as collateral or pledged security.
Lastly, it would be impractical to require secured parties to seek out
following foreclosure from businesses that may have
written assignments
3 41
ceased to exist.
The Federal Circuit's legal and public policy explanations mark an important
development in the law relating to financing with the use of intellectual property
as collateral.342 With certainty, a secured party now can expect that in the event
the debtor is in default, the secured party can become the owner of the intellectual
property collateral by operation of law as long as the secured party properly
disposes and purchases the collateral in accordance with Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.3 43 The secured party's ownership of the intellectual property
by operation of law reduces unnecessary costs in searching and demanding for the
debtor's signature. 3 " The recognition also enhances the value of the intellectual
property because the purchaser can trust that the chain of title of the intellectual
property has not been broken. 345 The purchaser is the new owner, as it has bought
from the secured party with ownership of the intellectual property by operation
of law.346 In summary, Sky Technologies v. SAP recognizes the importance of
the
secured transactions today with intellectual property collateral3 4and
7 adheres to
purposes of UCC Article 9 in encouraging secured financing.

340. Id.at 1381-82.
341. Id.
342. See id.at 1380-81.
343. Id.("[C]onsistent with sections 9-610 and 9-617, XACP received all of Ozro's rights in
the Collateral, making XACP the title-holder of the patents-in-suit after foreclosure.").

344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. If the secured party in a foreclosure sale of the patent collateral failed to properly list the
patents in the sale notice, some courts may not approve the validity of the sale. See Mayfair
Wireless LLC v. Celico P'ship, No. 11-772-SLR-SRF, 2013 WL 4657507, at*6 (D. Del., Aug. 30,
2013) (finding that "[n]one of the above-listed evidence identifies the '441 patent application
specifically, and as a result, the court declines to assume that the rights to the application for the
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V. SECURED PARTY'S RISKS RELATED TO IP COLLATERAL

Providing financing to businesses involving intellectual property assets does
present some risks to secured creditors.348 As intellectual property assets have
become increasingly valuable corporate assets, many companies aggressively
assert infringement against third parties. 349 The cost of infringement litigation is
high and a disruptive threat to the operation of the business.35 ° From the secured
creditor's perspective, in addition to the risk of nonperforming loans and the
difficulty of obtaining an accurate valuation of intellectual property assets, there
are at least two additional types of risks: (1) whether a grant of a security interest
in some circumstances can be deemed a fraudulent transfer; and (2) whether the
secured creditor is liable for infringement.35'
A. FraudulentTransfers
Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. is a cautionary tale for all
investors who pour their own financial resources to finance their own startups and
take a security interest in the startup's intellectual property.352 Dr. Amr Mohsen
developed hardware-logic-emulation technology and was the inventor of certain
patents.353 Dr. Mohsen founded the company, Aptix, and was the majority
shareholder, chief executive officer, and chairman of the company.35" Like many
other startups, the company was in financial trouble due to unsuccessful attempts
to borrow money, raise equity financing from outside investors, and merge with
another company.355 Dr. Mohsen used his own financial resources to make at
least $2 million in loans to the company.35 6 These loans were unsecured; they did

'441 patent were included in the foreclosure sale").
348. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 148 F. App'x 924 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Van
Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224 (E.D. Wash. 2005); Lex
Machina, Releases FirstAnnual PatentLitigation Year in Review, LEX MACHINA (May 13, 2014),
https://lexmachina.com/2014/05/patent-litigation-review/, archived at http://perma.cc/8XHXZXE7; Jim Kerstetter, How Much is thatPatentLawsuit Going to Cost You?, CNET (Apr. 5, 2012,

10:00 AM),

http://www.cnet.com/news/how-much-is-that-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/,

archivedat http://perma.cc/7L89-UF44.

349. See Machina, supra note 348 (explaining that over 6,000 patent lawsuits were filed in
2013, which is a twelve percent increase from the previous year).
350. See Kerstetter, supra note 348 (noting that according to the American Intellectual
Property Law Association, the average legal costs for a patent infringement claim between $1
million and $25 million dollars is approximately $2.5 million).
351. See Aptix, 148 F. App'x at 929-30; Van Well Nursery, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
352. Aptix, 148 F. App'x at 924.

353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.at 925.
Id. at 926.
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not have any property as security.357 The company's situation did not improve
and Dr. Mohsen then loaned at least $9.7 million between July 2000 and
September 2003 to the company. 358 These loans were secured by the company's
assets, including the patents; Dr. Mohsen received a grant of security interest in
the collateral. 35 9 The company used these loans to pay employees, vendors, and
creditors and to "keep the company alive and operating. ' 360 During the time of the
security interest grant, the company was in a patent infringement action against
a competitor and expected to receive an adverse judgment. 361 The competitor
assets that had already been encumbered to
sought to levy against the company's
362
Dr. Mohsen's security interest.
However, the Federal Circuit's majority panel held that "the making of a
secured loan instead of an unsecured loan in anticipation of an adverse judgment
establishes deliberate wrongful conduct" and concluded that Dr. Mohsen's
security interest in the patents was a fraudulent transfer by the company.363 The
majority panel affirmed the district court's decision to void Dr. Mohsen's security
interest in the patents.3
Whether one agrees with the panel's majority is not material here. What is
important is accessing potential risks to the secured party. As seen in this case,
routine business financing can be disregarded and labeled as a fraudulent transfer
to the detriment of the lenders.365 In providing financial resources to a startup, an
investor-as-secured-creditor must be aware of how courts view the investor's
conduct in determining whether the financing with intellectual property used as
collateral is legitimate.36 6
B. Infringement Liability
Another type of risk is infringement liability.3 67 This risk occurs if the
secured lender extends credit to a borrower, takes a security interest in the
borrower's property and assets, and then forecloses on collateral, which includes
products that are the subject of a patent infringement suit asserted by the patentee

357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 927.
363. Id. at 932 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The moneys obtained and the security interest
granted for the loan were routine business practice. The secured nine million dollars here loaned
provided essential funds to pay employees, vendors, and creditors. The facts of record do not
establish fraud under California statute and precedent.").
364. Id. at 930.
365. Id. at931-32.
366. See id. at 930-32.
367. See Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (E.D. Wash.
2005).
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against others, including the borrower.368 The question arises whether the secured
creditor is liable for infringement,
either under the direct infringement or
3 69
contributory infringement theory.
Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Insurance Co. illustrates a secured
creditor's potential patent infringement liability risk.37 ° Van Well owned a
particular patent for a new apple tree variety and sold the patented trees to the
public.37 ' On July, 9, 2004, Van Well brought a patent infringement action
against A/B Hop Farm and Mony Life Insurance ("Mony Life").372 Mony Life
had periodically made large loans to A/B Hop Farm from 1991 to 1996. 373 In
February, 1996, Mony Life loaned $2.5 million to A/B Hop Farm for the
purchase of Wallula Orchard Properties and the loan was secured by the Wallula
Orchard Properties.374 The parties signed the mortgage agreement.375 Thereafter,
A/B Hop Farms defaulted on the loan and Mony Life foreclosed on all property
collateral, including Wallula Orchard Properties.376
Van Well asserted that because Wallula Orchard Properties had planted apple
trees that infringed on the patent at issue, Mony Life was liable based on the
mortgage document between A/B Hop Farm and Mony Life.377 Van Well relied
on certain provisions in the mortgage document to advance its infringement
theory against Mony Life.378 Specifically, the mortgage agreement provided that
the mortgagor, in order to secure the payment of the $2.5 million dollar loan,
"mortgages, assigns and warrants" to the mortgage lender, Mony Life, the
Wallula land
together with numerous other interests including for example the
buildings, improvements, fixtures, permanent plantings, crops and other
farm products, rents, profits, income and proceeds therefrom, contract
rights, water rights, all judgments, awards of damages, settlements and
payments made for any taking of the property or damage to the property,
and a security interest in all irrigation, frost control and orchard cooling
facilities.379
The mortgage agreement also stated that the conveyances would be null and void,
but only if the mortgagor made all payment obligations and performed all

368. Id. at
369. Id.at
370. Id.at
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at
infringement").
379. Id.at

1225.
1226.
1224.
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1227 (noting that "Van Well did allege in its complaint the theory of contributory
1225.
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covenants in the agreement."' In the event that the mortgage was in default, the
mortgage agreement provided Mony Life with recourse to protect its security
interests in the property.381 Mony Life countered that these provisions were
"standard" in agricultural secured lending business.382
The court analyzed the direct infringement claim after it quickly disposed the
contributory infringement claim for lack of evidence.383 The court first noted that
Van Well raised an issue of first impression of a mortgage lender's liability for
patent infringement. 384 This issue required an examination of whether the
mortgage lender's conduct falls within "use" of the patent.385
The inquiry on "use" of the patent is a factual inquiry on case-by-case
basis.3 86 Van Well advanced a theory of direct infringement on the part of the
mortgage lender by urging the district court to interpret the term "use" broadly
and accept the theory of "constructive use" that Mony Life "should be held liable
because it had an ability to act with respect to the infringing trees and it possessed
sufficient rights that it 'could [have affected] the infringing activity if it so
chose.' 3 87 Van Well cited to a number of cases to support its argument, but the
district court rejected them because their facts were distinguishable from the case
at bar.388 Crucially, the cited cases involved actual conduct involving the
infringing product, actual control over, and possession of the infringing
product.3 89 Here, the district court noted that Mony Life "did not have, nor could
have had" the infringing apple trees.39° Therefore, Mony Life could not "use" the
patent because "how could one use an item it does not have?, 39 1 More
specifically, Mony Life could, as a secured creditor to secure the loans it made
to the borrower, "demand rights and performance of obligations in order to assure
the collateral pledged is maintained. 3 92 The district court observed that "[i]f
having these rights, without their actual exercise, was considered
393 'use' of the
protected.
be
ever
would
creditor
secure
no
then
itself
property
The court emphasized that holding a lending institution liable for direct
infringement under the facts in this case would threaten the foundation of a
dynamic, competitive, and stable economy and other threats:

380. 1d.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 1227-30.
384. Id. at 1228 (noting that "Van Well is correct in acknowledging the issue of a mortgage
lender's liability for plant patent infringement is one of first impression").
385. Id. at 1227-28.
386. Id.at 1229.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
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[A]t a minimum it would create tremendous apprehension and
uncertainty in lending, instill additional disincentives to lend and
discourage productive enterprises, and perhaps threaten the very
foundation of the agricultural lending industry and the economy it serves.
The costs associated with defending against an intellectual property
infringement suit and any liability associated therewith could easily
exceed the amount originally at stake in the underlying transaction.3 94
Congress, not courts, was the appropriate body for Van Well to seek the
extension of its patent protection against mortgage lenders.3 95 Accordingly, Mony
Life's authority to control Wallula Orchard property pursuant to the mortgage
agreement failed to support Van Well's claim of direct infringement against
Mony Life.396
The court clarified that its decision was not dictated by Mony Life's argument
that the provisions in the mortgage agreement were merely "standard" in the
agricultural secured lending business. 397 The court warned that "standard" lender
behavior is "a mutable concept, and it will respond to the liability rules the Courts
'
and Congress put into place."398
However, "[i]n this context, while lenders may
offer deep-pocket appeal to the patent holder, lender liability has not been met
with widespread judicial acceptance in most tort-liability scenarios. 3 99
Moreover, the court rejected Van Well's request for a declaration that Mony
Life's security interest in any of the allegedly infringing trees in Wallula Orchard
be voided and the infringing trees ordered destroyed.4 °0 The court denied the
request for lack of support in patent law.4 °1
In summary, there are two identifiable risks that a secured creditor may face
in financing innovation.40 2 First, a grant of security interest in some
circumstances could be deemed as a fraudulent transfer.4 3 This risk can be
minimized in self-financing cases by routinely taking a security interest when the
self-financier provides a loan to his or her company. This consistent behavior
will reduce the inference of fraudulent conveyance stemming from selective
granting and receiving security interests. Second, the secured creditor is liable
for infringement. 4°' This risk is very rare in financing innovation by the private

394. Id. at 1230.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1229-30.
398. Id. at 1229.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1230.
401. Id.
402. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 148 F. App'x 924, 931-32 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Van Well, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1229-30.
403. Aptix Corp., 148 F. App'x at 931-32.
404. See Van Well, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
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sector and can be minimized through careful drafting of the security agreement.40 5
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM HISTORICAL FINANCING INNOVATIONS

Technological advancements in the United States have profoundly changed
every sector of the economy since the United States Supreme Court decided
Waterman v. McKenzie, recognizing the use of intellectual property assets as
security in business financing.40 6 The loan secured by two patents in 1891
represents the quintessential American system of supporting small businesses, as
patents are major contributors to innovation and job creation.40 7
Along with technical advancements, not surprisingly, there are new means for
businesses today to obtain financing.40 8 Equity financing and crowdfunding are
two examples.40 9 In broad terms, in equity financing, investors will acquire
shares or equity in the business in exchange for the investment provided by the
investors to the business. 10 Equity financing allows businesses to have access to
capital on a small and large scale."' Equity financing has its shortcomings;
founders of businesses in equity financing are generally concerned about their
loss of control or direction of the company.4" 2 Crowdfunding leverages the ease
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Bus. L. REv. 1, 5 (2012); John Floegel, Equity FinancingforPublic Corporations: Reasons and
Methods to EncourageIt, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1411, 1418 (1990).
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of mobile online communication to enable businesses to present their nascent
ideas for funding from the crowd or supportive online users.4 13
Despite these new methods to obtain financing, small businesses in the
United Sates have been struggling to gain access to credit.4 14 The recent financial
crisis and its aftermath continue to limit the ability of businesses to obtain
credit.4 15 Banks are still not eager to lend to small businesses, as the numbers
show a twenty percent decline in small business lending since the financial
crisis.416 Most troubling, access to credit417for small businesses was already in
steady decline prior to the financial crisis.
A few online lenders have begun to enter the small business lending sector
and utilize technological sophistication to ration their loans to small businesses.4 8
They use innovative software and data metrics from social media interactions and
Yelp comments to analyze a potential borrower's application for a loan.419 Their
analytic system, however, ignores the borrower's intellectual property assets.4 20
The lessons learned from the history of legal development for financing
innovation suggests that there is a need for both traditional and online lenders to
appreciate the intellectual property assets held by small businesses. The
intellectual property assets should be included in the analytics in assessing the
overall health of a business seeking a loan or a line of credit. Lenders should take
comfort in decisional laws that have consistently encouraged financing when
" ' The long
intellectual property assets serve as collateral.42
history of courts
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accepting different types of intellectual property as security in financing,
recognizing perfection of security interests in intellectual property, and elevating
a secured party as the owner of the foreclosed intellectual property by operation
of law demonstrates a favorable legal ecosystem for lenders to extend credit to
small businesses with trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and patents as parts
of their assets available to serve as collateral.
CONCLUSION

Global competition is fierce. Access to financing for small businesses and
recognition of intellectual property must be at the center of discussion of how the
United States can maintain its innovative edge. Looking across the Pacific
Ocean, China has embraced a comprehensive strategy to increase innovation by
providing financing based on the intellectual property assets of businesses. 2 2
However, China's intellectual property financing is beyond the scope of this
Article and will be discussed in a separate article. The central issue remains:
how will the United States fuel its small businesses in need of financing for
innovation?
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